In the aftermath of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's December 8-10visit to Washington，Congress must take stock of the Bush Administration's concessions to China on theTaiwan issue and assess what the United States received in return for compromisingits commitment to Taiwan's democracy.A cold-eyed assessment of the U.S.-China relationshipsince the beginning of the Bush Administration will dispel the policy myths thathave colored the U.S.perception of China's role in Asia and suggest how best tomanage China in the coming decades.But dispelling the myths requires an understandingof why the early Bush Administration's China policy changed after September 11.
China's April 2001downing of an American aircraft in international airspaceand the subsequent two-week detention of the crew brought a temporary sense of realismto China policy that was buttressed by the incoming Bush Administration's judgmentthat China was becoming a serious challenge to many American interests in Asia.
However ，in a post-September 11world ，the Administration's preoccupationwith the war on terrorism ，Iraq ，and especially North Korea has led policymakersto downplay China's resistance and hostility to U.S.initiatives in Asia and elsewhere.Over the past year，U.S.officials have proclaimed themselves "absolutely delightedwith the state of our relations with the People's Republic of China and the directionwe're going ，"1and those American China scholars long known for their sunny viewsof the People's Republic of China （PRC ）have added glowing commentaries of theirown.212
In September，Secretary of State Colin Powell was only a shade less ebullientin his observation that "U.S.relations with China are the best they have been sincePresident Nixon's first visit."Not that relations were warm and fuzzy，he explained，but rather that "neither we nor the Chinese leadership anymore believe that thereis anything inevitable about our relationship ——either inevitably bad or inevitablygood."3
In contrast to Secretary Powell's balanced assessment ，the general appreciationof America's post-9/11relationship with China is riddled with myths and misconceptions.Indeed，even President George W.Bush declared that China was a "partner in diplomacyworking to meet the dangers of the 21st century"4——certainly an overstatement.
A dispassionate review of China's foreign affairs ，trade，and national securitypolicies over the past two years reveals that China has usually opposed U.S.interests，sometimes remained neutral，but never cooperated in achieving American goals.Inthe wake of Premier Wen's visit to Washington ，the Administration and Congressshould reexamine their China policy and consider why their candid ，firm ，andsuccessful pre-9/11China policy has been abandoned in favor of a policy of conciliationand compromise that has yielded little beyond rhetoric.
Specifically，the Administration should：
ReassessAmerica's strategic interests in the Western Pacific with an eye tohow China fits in ，whether as a friend，a neutral，or ——as is so often thecase——an adversary.Make democratic reform in China the top priority of America'sChina policy.Firmly adhere to America's 50-year-old policy of dismissing China'sclaims of sovereignty over Taiwan.Be publicly candid about China's behavior andavoid painting U.S.-China relations in undeservedly glowing terms such as "delighted"and "better than ever."Hold China to a results-based standard rather than blandlyaccepting China's promises that its proliferation behavior，unfair trade policies，and aggressive military buildup will change in return for concrete concessions fromthe U.S.Reconsider China's growing military threat to Taiwan in the context ofSecretary Powell's simple benchmark ：The differences between China and Taiwan arefundamentally political.They cannot be solved by military means……An arms build-up，like those new missiles opposite Taiwan ，only deepen tensions ，deepen suspicion.Whether China chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan willtell us a great deal about the kind of re-lationship China seeks not only with itsneighbors ，but with us.5
Thus far，China has chosen only coercion against Taiwan.
Many American policymakers，scholars ，and journalists view China not forwhat it is，but for what they hope it to be.Promoting myths about China neitherhelps change the behavior of the Chinese government nor serves American nationalinterests.In fact，it gives the Chinese leave to perpetuate bad practices whileat the same time creating unrealistic expectations that will ultimately undermineU.S.policies.
At the outset ，it should be recognized that China ：
Has stepped up threats of war against democratic Taiwan ；Has not been a "partner，"strategic or otherwise，in the war on terrorism；Was not helpful during the IraqWar and is not supportive of U.S.goals in reconstructing the country ；Fully supportsNorth Korea in its tense nuclear negotiations with the U.S.；Is the world's premierproliferator of dangerous materials ，precursors ，and equipment and technologiesrelating to weapons of mass destruction （WMD ）and their delivery systems ；Neglects，and even willfully violates ，its World Trade Organization and bilateral tradecommitments ；Continues its pattern of severe human rights abuses ；and Is likelyto force another maritime confrontation with the U.S.in the South China Sea.CommonChina Policy Myths Myth #1：China has helped the U.S.in the war on terrorism.
Assessing the course of the U.S.-China relationship as the war on terrorismenters its third year ，it may be instructive to examine how China has or has notcooperated in meeting the challenge of global terrorism.
The September 11，2001，terrorist attacks on the U.S.stunned China，andon September 12，the Chinese president conveyed his deepest sympathies to PresidentBush.Soon afterward，however，China hedged its support for the brewing war onterrorism with immediate words of caution that American military action should "respectthe United Nations'charter and norms of international law."6China also incongruouslylinked "terrorism"with what Beijing characterized as Taiwan's "splittism"7andcalled for "reliable evidence"before it would countenance American military strikesagainst Afghanistan.8
From the beginning，China lobbied U.N.Security Council members to put thebrakes on American action.In a telephone conversation on Sep-tember 18，ChinesePresident Jiang Zemin told British Prime Minister Tony Blair that U.N.approvaland "irrefutable evidence"were needed for China to back armed retaliation for theattacks on the U.S.In a similar call to French President Jacques Chirac beforeChirac's trip to Washington ，Jiang cautioned that "under current circumstances，keeping sober-minded is especially needed ，and prudence should be exercised inhandling relevant issues."Jiang's message to Russian President Vladimir Putin wasthe same.9
Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the Un
Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at Chin