The purpose of this article is to investigate the main characteristics of thediplomatic policy of New China during the period of its formation and its historicalimplications.
I."Leaning to One Side"and the Revolutionary Nature of New China‘s Diplomacy
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China （CPC ）began to considerNew China ‘s diplomatic policy around the end of 1948.The main diplomatic principlesformulated within approximately three months consisted of the following ：Non-recognitionof imperialism and a bias towards the Soviet Union（later called "leaning to oneside"），"building a new stove"（i.e.，cooking one ’s meal in a new way ），and "cleaning up the house first，then Inviting guests."In the light of the guidingprinciples and the problems to be resolved，all these "three principles showeda strong revolutionary commitment.
By "revolutionary commitment"we mean that they appeared under the Guidanceof the theory of Chinese revolution and were closely linked to the fundamental problemsto be resolved in the late phase of the Chinese revolution.In this sense ，``leaningto one side"was the most representative.
The concept of leaning to one side had two meanings ——the guiding principleand development strategy for New China.Firstly ，Mao Zedong ‘s motive in proposing"leaning to one side"was to answer the question of on which side China should standin an international configuration of states divided into two camps -the socialistcamp and the capitalist camp.At this level.，leaning to one side was both a guidingprinciple for the diplomatic strategy of New
China ，and a vivid description of its diplomatic pattern.Alliance with theSoviet Union and non-recognition of imperialist states were only specific manifestationsof this general pattern.
Leaning to one side was a product of more than twenty years of revolution andwas put forward as a cardinal principle on the eve of victory.It is impossibleto interpret the formation of the principle of leaning to one side，or the inherentlimitations in the later readjustments made to New China‘s foreign policy，unlessthe understanding of the relations between the Chinese revolution and world politicson the part of the CPC leadership are taken into consideration .
The great changes brought about by the end of World War I and the victory ofthe October Revolution in Russia established the international background for theChinese revolution led by the Communists.Lenin ‘s theory of imperialisrn，theOctober Revolution，the lessons learnt from the failure of the 1911Revolution ，and the experience and plight of the early CPC leaders were all incorporated intothe Communists"knowledge of important matters such as international affairs andthe relationship between the Chinese revolution and the world.In their view，"theworld capitalist and imperialist powers are in collaboration to exploit the proletariatand the oppressed nations throughout the world."The Chinese revolution would prevailover imperialism "only if it
integrates itself into the world revolutionary trend of the oppressed nationsand is linked to the international proletarian revolutionary movement.""This isthe only road that will enable the Chinese toiling masses to gain liberation fromimperialist oppression."1As testified by history，this knowledge gained in theearly stages influenced the strategies and tactics of the CPC in all later periods.
At the beginning of the anti-Japanese national united front ，the CPC CentralCommittee pointed out that "the Chinese people are faced with the task of linkingChina ‘s anti-Japanese national united front with the world peace front，"andChina "should work for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism"with Great Britainand America.2In January 1940，against the background of deteriorating relationsbetween the Soviet Union on one side and America，Great Britain and France on theother ，and after the German invasion of Poland and increasing conflict betweenthe Guomindang and the CPC，Mao Zedong reemphasized in "On New Democracy"that ，"the Chinese revolution …forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.""In the international situation of today，the’heroes‘in the colonies and semi-colonieseither line up on the imperialist front and become part of the forces of world counter-revolution，or they line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of the forces of worldrevolution.They must do one or the other ，for there is no third choice."3MaoZedong meant that if there was a confrontation between the Soviet Union and theWestern nations the CPC leadership was bound to stand with Moscow and adopt radicalmeasures in the domestic struggle .
At the end of 1941，Moscow formed an alliance with Washington and London againstfascism and the leadership of the CPC modified their views on the irreconcilabilitybetween international revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.They believedthat the alliance had created a "new world order"in which important internationalproblems must be solved through "agreements between states headed by America，GreatBritain and the Soviet Union."and domestic problems "must also be solved in accordancewith democratic principles"4Within the overall pattern of cooperation among thethree world powers，the Guomindang dared not engage in large-scale anti-Communistactivities，and the CPC was also restrained from radical social revolution ."Forsome time after the War the whole international situation will still be one in whichthe democratic forces cooperate and form a united front ，China will have to bea democratic republic before it enters socialism."5The CPC made adjustments toits domestic and foreign policies several times between the summer of 1942and theend of the War of Anti-Japanese Aggression，but all were within this basic framework.
The outbreak of full-scale civil war and the beginning of the Cold War betweenWashington and Moscow in the summer of 1946made the leaders of the CPC change thebasic views they had held since the summer of 1942，and the concept of an "intermediaryzone"was raised.This concept had rich connotations and far-reaching significance.One element of this concept was that the rivalry between America and the SovietUnion would not decidedly influence the situation in China.6However，the conceptof an "intermediary zone"lasted for only a short period in the minds of the CPCleadership.
In September 1947the Communist and Workers ‘Parties of nine European countriesestablished Information Bureau and issued a declaration stating that the world hadbeen divided into two camps ，the anti-imperialist democratic camp headed by theSoviet Union and the imperialist camp headed by the United States.Although thedeclaration made no mention of the major significance of the Chinese revolution ，the CPC Central Committee lost no time in welcoming the theory of "two camps"anddeclared that it would side with the Soviet camp.
From the spring of 1948，the Communist leaders began to express their ardentdesire to strengthen their ties with the Soviet Union and make urgent politicaland ideological preparations for this new development within the party.Liu Shaoqistated in a simple and straightforward manner in an article that in the currentsituation it was impossible to remain neutral ，and that forming an alliance ornot forming an alliance with the Soviet Union was "a demarcation line between revolutionand counter-revolution，"and "a demarcation line between progress and retrogression"for a nation.7
Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at Chin
The Formation of Diplomatic Policy in New China and