War or Peace Over TAIWAN？(2)

　　On the mainland ，most people are not eager for a war against Taiwan.On theisland，roughly four-fifths of the people wish to leave the question of Chineseor Taiwanese ultimate sovereignty undecided for a long time. The se stances are compatiblewith a temporary truce between Taipei and Beijing ，by which the mainland wouldnot pursue force while the island would not pursue independence during a cooling-offperiod.Their unofficial foundations might agree to note a third party's list ofcurrent diplomatic ties （without legitimating these formally ），so that neitherside could later claim the other was breaking the truce because of old diplomacy.Cross-straits negotiations on all other topics could be more fruitful if a "timeout"were called on both the island's implicit threat of non-Chinese sovereigntyand the mainland's military threat.If a truce were to be negotiated，which agenciescould do that ？For once ，the answer is easy ：Unofficial foundations representingeach side already exist ，and they regularly contact each other（often by fax）。They can do so only because they studiously avoid all questions of sovereignty anddipomatic status.They are the PRC's nominally non-governmental Association forRelations Across the Taiwan Strait（ARATS ），and the ROC's "private"Straits ExchangeFoundation（SEF ）。In bargaining for a temporary truce，as in negotiating thepractical matters with which ARATS and SEF have previously dealt，questions aboutformal titles ，flags，and status have to be postponed.Such a truce would beformally unenforceable in any court —but that would not at all vitiate its politicaland military usefulness.（Several arms limitation treaties of global importanceremain unratified and are legally invalid ，but their texts despite that handicaphave mostly determined what happens in practice.）To strengthen moderates in bothBeijing and Taipei，and to develop a more pragmatic and less symbolic approachto the problem of preventing a war in the foreseeable future，SEF and ARATS mightagree that：The Beijing side would not pursue major military force to assert itsclaim to Taiwan for several decades （e.g.，50years ），and the Taipei side wouldforswear declaring non-Chinese independence on Taiwan during that same period.Thetwo foundations might also note ，without approving，an unofficial neutral party'slist of the diplomatic liaisons their authorities currently claim.They would permitthat this agreement might later be modified by further interim agreements betweenthe two foundations in the course of the ongoing discussions to which they are alreadycommitted.Such a truce would be most easily negotiable if not further detailed.It would also ，however，be less subject to later sabotage by go-for-broke militaristsin China or by go-for-broke separatists on Taiwan if it could include provisionsabout advance notice of military exercises.PRC softliners might want to make clearthat Taiwan autonomists could not alone decide when China had used force，convertinga minor or accidental event into a major cause for Taipei action that Beijing wouldregard as secession.Similarly，the arrangement would be more stable if ARATS andSEF could agree ，at least tacitly ，that Beijing and Taipei would not encroachon each other's present diplomatic links.Thus PRC hardliners could not later claimthat the ROC's current level of diplomacy amounts to a declaration of independencefrom China—just as during the truce，the Taiwan hardliners would be restrictedfrom making such a declaration.It would not be necessary to do more，as regardsthis symbolically sensitive but practically minor sovereignty-related issue ，thanto take note together of a third party's（maybe some neutral academic's ）previouspublication of a simple list of the current diplomatic posts of each side.The twofoundations could decide that ，for the sake of peace and further negotiationsbetween each other，self-restraint against changing this situation would be mutuallybeneficial.In many respects，this truce proposal differs from harder-to-negotiatesettlement plans that have been suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal and by Joseph S.Nye ，Jr.This truce would be agreed by the officially unofficial foundations，not by the governments whose pride in stately symbols still prevents any diplomaticcontact between them.This proposal formally suggests mutual undertakings only fora specified period，an interim truce rather than a final deal.The current cross-straitproblem is that Beijing leaders have not explicitly agreed to a real confederationyet ，and Taipei leaders have not explicitly agreed to irrevocable Chinese unificationyet.This truce would practically —though not explicitly —assure the emergenceafter fifty years of a Chinese confederation retaining full democracy at least onTaiwan；so it would meet each side's main substantive demands，which each side'spoliticians are still too awed by sovereign emblems to serve effectively.The mostcrucial aspect of the truce would be the long-time-future date.From Taipei's viewpoint，its role would be like the 1997expiry of the New Territories lease ，which arbitrarilydelayed Beijing's moment for implementing another claim.The PRC has been througha violent revolution，and the respite would allow more time for Chinese politicsto change.From Beijing's viewpoint ，a far-distant date would also allow timefor Taiwan's warring politicians to gain more distance from the memory of ChiangKai-shek's repression ，which still gives some impetus to ardent separatism amongTaiwanese leaders whom Chiang imprisoned，repressed，or exiled.Such a date wouldalso suggest（though not explicitly ensure）a definite remote occasion when somekind of unification would be probable ，because of China's likely global strengthat that time.Actually，this will be a fact to affect both the island and the mainlandthen—with or without a truce.Beijing's undertaking in this proposal would be nomore than President Jiang Zemin's motto that "Chinese do not attack Chinese"—exceptthat it would be uttered in this case by ARATS in assurance to SEF as a Taiwan representative，not just to a mainland audience.Peace is ，however，against the interests ofhardliners in Beijing who insist in a surreal fashion （despite the evidence oftheir eyes）that Taiwan has no proper government.Among the PRC elite，symbolicinterests concerning Taiwan have often tended to overwhelm concrete interests.WhenGeorge Bush announced a major sale of F-16aircraft to Taiwan （while on the campaigntrail in Texas，where these planes are made），the PRC reaction was surprisinglylow-key even though China's concrete interests in Taiwan were set back by Bush'saction.But when Lee Teng-hui received a tourist visa to visit his alma mater ata hard-to-reach city in upstate New York，the PRC cancelled the American visitof State Councillor Li Guixian，recalled the Chinese air force commander and hisdelegation halfway through their major tour of the US ，postponed indefinitelya meeting of Chinese and American legal experts ，and summoned US Ambassador StapletonRoy to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing to lodge a strong protest，demanding a reversalof the visa decision and warning that US-PRC relations were endangered at all levels.The F-16s were a concrete threat—and their military effectiveness delays China'sTaiwan claim even though Bush suggested otherwise.But the symbolism of the touristvisa brought a much greater PRC reaction.Lee's trip was not a pragmatic move forTaiwan，although the warplane purchase surely was.Taipei's undertaking in thistruce is no more than the assurances against any open declaration of Taiwan independencethat both KMT and DPP politicians have often expressed to security-conscious Taiwanvoters—except that in this case it would be uttered to ARATS as a mainland representative.Peace is nonetheless opposed in Taipei by two kinds of symbolists ：a small minoritywho insist that Taiwanese must never consider the option of concurrently being Chinese，and very many who irrationally overestimate the value of continued ROC demands fordiplomatic "breathing space ，"even though this effort has now become totally irrelevantto Taiwan's security.Taiwan on legal grounds qualifies to be a state under a Viennaconvention—but this is irrelevant to the fact that most countries for political，non-legal ，and amoral reasons （especially China's size ）recognize the PRC.Taipei's truly pragmatic diplomacy is with Washington and Beijing ，not with Tegucigalpaand Ouagadougou.Taiwan will not be saved by Chad （which has recognized the ROC）。Taiwan is not greatly threatened by the Cook Islands（which has recognized the PRCdespite much weeping and gnashing of teeth in Taipei）。Taiwan's mainstream politicians，both KMT and DPP，talk mainly about shadows of sovereign autonomy rather than concreteguarantees of practical autonomy.Since the contradiction between these will probablylast longer than it takes for the PRC to gain in economic and military strength ，these politicians misrepresent the people of their island ，who in surveys wantno war，a multiple identity，and guarantees of future freedom.Both ROC and PRCleaders have on several occasions suggested conditions for peaceful unification ，of which the most interesting from Beijing were published early in the 1980s.Thefirst of these rather vague proposals came in a 1981statement by PLA Gen.Ye Jianying.Ye's "nine points"provided that Taiwan could maintain its army after unification.Ye mentioned no particular reason for this separate army.But the adequate availabilityof Taiwan-controlled means on the island，to enforce any other agreed points ，would certainly increase Taiwan's incentive to accept other aspects of a negotiatedpackage.Actually ，Taipei does not need Beijing's permission for an army on theisland，since it already has one there.But Taipei could well use recognition fromBeijing of the existence of its military，which is a crucial basis for Taiwan'sparticipation in cross-straits talks on any other topic.If a military truce cannotbe negotiated ，no other agreement will be regarded on Taiwan as long-lasting.Deng Xiaoping in 1983suggested "six points"for this negotiation.As he grew older，Deng said that his eyes would not close until Taiwan was unified with China.Finally，they closed anyway.Before Deng's death ，President Jiang Zemin in 1995announcedanother list of "eight points."These precluded Taiwan independence or "two Chinas，"although recent clarifications from Beijing have hesitantly suggested that the"one China"might be something like a happy Buddha of the future，not necessarilyidentical with the present PRC.（Hardliners，who make most statements from Beijingabout "one China，"identify it with the PRC.Quite inconsistently，however，otherPRC statements have probed Taiwan's possible acceptance of the view that the "oneChina"might be a future one—and have received not much response from Taiwan forlocal political reasons.）

　　President Jiang has said he would negotiate with "Taipei authorities on anytopic of their concern"and suggested "consultation on an equal basis soon."Jiangsaid that "Chinese do not attack Chinese"and that only separatists and foreignersshould be attacked.Taiwan's "autonomy"within China was promised ，although inan overture for peaceful unification with Taiwan that word would have to mean somethingnotably different than it does，for example，in Hong Kong.More important ，becausethe PRC is now relatively stronger than it was in Ye's time ，were Jiang's undertakingsthat Taiwan could "also retain its armed forces and administer its party，governmentaland military systems by itself"and that Beijing "will not station troops or sendadministrative personnel."The PRC proposal for Taiwan's "system"is unlike the"system"in Hong Kong ，although neither Beijing or Taipei has emphasized this.There seems to be a sufficiently clear understanding in Beijing ，among any leaderswho may not look forward to a war over Taiwan ，that Taipei will not give up itsmilitary soon.Jiang suggested that using force would not be the ideal PRC tacticfor unifying China.Shortly after Jiang's statement ，Taiwan Premier Lien Changave a speech calling for gradual unification as differences in politics and economiclevels between "the two shores"are slowly reduced.Two months later，PresidentLee Teng-hui issued a similar "six point"statement that called for building confidencebetween the two sides by expanding contacts in functional fields and at internationalmeetings.But he apparently did not instruct SEF to test whether Jiang's representativesin ARATS would use their leader's undertakings as the basis for an unofficial truce—and some evidence suggests that Jiang's Taiwan policy was opposed by hardlinersin the PLA，especially Adm.Liu Huaqing and Gen.Zhang Zhen.The grant of a USvisa to Lee brought Beijing-Taipei contacts to a temporary halt.Chinese naval andmissile exercises were the news of the following year.The two leaderships acrossthe strait trust each other not at all，although the "masses"under them are notmutually acrimonious.What identity do most people on Taiwan actually want？Carefulopinion surveys among the mostly nonintellectual and nonpolitician majority on Taiwansuggest that about one-fifth of all people there want independence（either immediatelyor later），but less than one-tenth want independence as soon as possible.Anotherfifth want the status quo now but unification with China later，although very fewwant unification right away.Another fifth want a permanent continuance of Taiwan'scurrent situation ，i.e.，a nationally uncommitted but practical kind of autonomy.The most popular specific option，garnering one-quarter in an early 1997surveyand as much as two-fifths in 1995and 1996and a later 1997survey，is to maintainthe status quo now and to make a definite decision about Chinese or Taiwanese identitylater.The Taiwanese increasingly see themselves as such，even though most of themalso want to defer their eventual decision about political nationality.The truceterms proposed above would serve the will of this largest plurality ，allowingthem to decide without a war but in light of China's growing relative power andafter a term of more confident autonomy than they will have without a truce.Theconcerns of many Taiwanese about unification are explicitly linked to their incomes，whose average is much higher than on the mainland.Military security is inextricablefrom their practical interest in economic security.Business interests on Taiwanhave "moved an unwilling state"toward more accommodation with China.But intellectualsin both Taiwan and the PRC（for opposite reasons）talk mainly about abstract patrioticideals，not daily life.They glorify identity（rentong ）。When intellectual researcherssurvey the ways most Taiwanese actually identify themselves ，they admit theirdistress at the careful reticence of the modal answer.Most on the island are willingto be politically part-time Chinese ，so long as that choice cannot hurt them；but they have also in recent years become more distinctively Taiwanese.Taiwan voters'interests are far less abstruse than educated writers'discourses imply.A Taipeitaxi driver in 1997put his doubts about unification in terms of welfare more thanidentity："We have had the experience of being taken over once by bandits [he meantChiang Kai-shek's army]，and we will not allow it to happen a second time.Whathas the mainland done for us？Nothing.What we have built up here，we have doneby ourselves."When Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party has won some elections，its candidates（like those of the KMT ）have run largely on administrative andanti-corruption issues.But the DPP was originally pro-independence —and the KMThas also been increasingly pro-autonomist.The DPP has no electoral interest eitherin changing its history or in presenting itself as provocative to the mainland.For Taiwanese ，Chinese identity remains a live option if they wish to choose it，not mainly because of their politically ambiguous pre-1895southern Chinese history，but because most Taiwanese saw their daily lives modernize for three decades afterthe mid-1950s under a Chinese regime.The DPP leader Hs üHsin-liang has a son whochose to study at Peking University.Taiwan autonomists seldom deny that their heritage（xuetong ）is Chinese.But unless they are defeated militarily，they will notgive up their current freedoms.A future Taiwan government could conceivably agreeto some form of unification with Beijing，while also declining to throw peacefuladvocates of separatism into jail.The island's politicians often suggest that Taiwanshould above all refuse to forswear the symbols of their state.But sovereigntyis not food to eat.It shelters nobody from the rain.The main external protectorof the ROC is not among the nations that recognize it.If Taipei decided for practicalreasons to compromise symbols of sovereignty at least temporarily —but not to disownits control of an army sufficient to assure that "Taiwan people will rule Taiwan，"as Beijing says —then the island's people would benefit if that meant at leasta long-term peace.The Taiwan Relations Act ，a domestic US law，would be unaffected.The whole issue can be largely reduced to a question about domestic politics，thistime in Taiwan.Will Taiwanese-only OR Chinese-Taiwanese self-identification prevailon the island ？Nobody but Taiwanese can decide whether they will also be Chinese.In practice ，however，it is more useful to phrase the issue facing them not solelyin terms of existential choices ，but also in terms of unintended situations thataffect the results of these choices.Just as economic development is likely to diversifymainland politics more than Party conservatives wish，also the island's peoplecould more attentively heed the external context of their decisions about theirnational identity.Most intellectuals willfully downplay evidence that cognitivedetermination is not all-powerful.But ordinary Taiwanese （like ordinary PuertoRicans，in a fascinating comparative case）allow non-normative considerationsto play a partial role in their political identification.The DPP was founded tosupport Taiwan's independence.The center of its green-and-white party flag showsan outline map of Taiwan.When a party spokesman once was asked whether this meantthe DPP was uninterested in China ，he coyly replied that when the KMT governmentrecovered the mainland，his party would put an outline map of China in the middleof its flag.The DPP，for the National Assembly elections of 1991，had a platformfavoring declaration of a Republic of Taiwan.In the island-wide election in 1992，the DPP manifesto became just slightly more abstract，favoring "One China，OneTaiwan."The KMT platform that same year，however，began unambiguously："We insistthat there is only one unified China……"But neither of these themes played flawlesslyon the stump，where most people were sensibly concerned about the mainland threatand actually had pride in being both Chinese and Taiwanese.Electoral competitionin the mid-1990s，in the context of Taiwan's security problem，caused the publicpolicies of the two largest parties to converge.As late as February 1995，a DPPconvention agreed without a formal vote that the party should "continue to advocatethe declaration of a Republic of Taiwan."But Party workers soon suggested thatin order to win more electoral victories，the DPP would have to moderate this position.They called for a revised party platform，asserting instead the "irrefutable factthat Taiwan is an independent country"already.Nobody openly disagrees that "Taiwanpeople will rule Taiwan."The devil is not in that principle.It is perhaps noteven in the details —but in a lack of will among the politicians of both Beijingand Taipei to seek support on more practical grounds than notions of identity andsovereignty.Large surveys of Taiwan's citizens in 1992，1993，and 1996（shortlyafter one of the PLA exercises）asked two questions aiming to separate the ethnic-normativebases of their political identities from pragmatic-situational bases.The questionswere：1）Some people think that if Taiwan after independence could maintain apeaceful relationship with the Chinese Communist government ，then Taiwan shouldbecome an independent country —do you agree？And 2），Some people favor the ideathat if Taiwan and China were to become comparably developed economically ，socially，and politically ，then the two sides of the strait should be united into one country—do you agree？Responses could be cross-tabulated.An increasing minority （one-tenthin 1992，one-fifth in 1996）both opposed unification even after future PRC politicalchange and favored Taiwan's independence if the island could avoid war with themainland.A sharply decreasing portion of the respondents （41percent in 1992，but 17percent in 1996）both favored unification after PRC political change andopposed Taiwan independence even if the island could remain safe.An increasinglylarge plurality （27percent in 1992，39percent in 1996）had a totally pragmaticnational identity ，favoring Chinese reunification after cross-strait disparitieswere lessened ，but also favoring Taiwan independence if this could be safe.Thismost popular view in 1996is just part-time-patriotic ，for either China or Taiwan.National existentialists of either type are aghast at it.But why should ordinarypeople support state elites more than themselves？This "unprincipled"view is moresensitive to Taiwan's rich history and current security needs than anything offeredby statespeople on either side of the strait.3）Can Taipei and Beijing LeadersActually Negotiate a Truce？

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