The cautious centrism of Taiwan's electorate caused Taipei leaders to moderatetheir stances in the mid-1990s，but it also caused them to press for consensusagainst any decision that would embarrass any of them.In the first direct presidentialelections in 1996，a fuzzy position assured Lee Teng-hui，who is Taiwanese butis also the candidate of the party that can most easily claim to represent stability，a big electoral win.The main effect of China's missile tests near Taiwan ，justbefore the ballot ，may not have been to move voters away from the DPP candidatePeng Ming-min （whose staff had privately and accurately reported long before themissiles that they expected to lose up to one-third of their usual local supportersin the presidential race，where security issues are vital）。China's saber-rattlingexpressed to Taiwan's voters the PRC view that independence could not be attained.But this threat also soon brought KMT and DPP politicians together in a promiseto each other that，in effect，they would reach no serious agreement with Beijing.In December ，1996，President Lee called leaders from Taiwan's various partiesto a "National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations."The consensusdocument from this conference stipulated that "The [KMT]government should strengthenthe mechanisms by which opposition political parties……can fully participate inmajor policy decisions regarding relations with the Chinese mainland."This promiseby the KMT to the DPP almost surely scuttles in advance any kind of truce with themainland，even on the uncertain premise that Beijing would agree to terms thatwould benefit the interests of Taiwan's people.Lee has apparently decided a priorithat his ruling party should assure the electorate it will not rule on this politicalidentity issue.He has given the DPP（and perhaps even the small Taiwan IndependenceParty ，which is also an opposition party，if this document is credible ）vetopower over any important agreement with China.The ROC president has thus inadvertentlyassured Beijing hardliners that they can never lose on the Taiwan issue in theirdomestic PRC politics.He has suggested to reformers that they have nothing to gainin Beijing politics thorough espousal of generous policies toward Taiwan.AlthoughLee speaks in favor of current negotiations and eventual reunification，his 1996policy of minority consent to any major island-mainland agreement suggests thatthese talks would not lead to any military armistice，even a temporary one ，muchless a political settlement.This policy of minority consent in Taipei is the mostdocumentable reason why war is eventually probable over Taiwan.The undocumented，secret positions of mainland militarists may well overdetermine that same bellicoseresult.Statist intellectuals in China tend to demonize Lee as a traitor.They areright to say that he disconfirms his own public statements for reunification byhis public promises to Taiwan separatists.They also are right to suggest that mostTaiwanese people are less sure than many Taiwanese politicians about the benefitsof forswearing Chinese identity.But they are wrong to suggest that Lee Teng-huias an individual is responsible for the difficulty in reaching a PRC-ROC accord.Most other politicians on the island either have similar views or have been toofrightened by the intensity of separatist sentiment to talk seriously about thesecurity problem.Chen Shui-bian，who is the most likely DPP candidate for presidentdespite his defeat for re-election as Taipei's mayor，has recently tried not toprovoke the PRC ，but Chen is widely perceived as favoring permanent independence.The ROC Constitution specifies that any presidential candidate with a pluralitywins；so Chen stands some chance of election if KMT factions split.The most likelynext KMT candidate，Vice-President Lien Chan ，was asked in an interview by thisauthor about his "family."Lien proudly noted that one of his paternal ancestorshad come to Taiwan along with the early entrepreneur-warlord Koxinga.He downplayedthe fact that his mother was a mainlander ，admitting this only after it was mentionedto him.Electoral politics deeply affects what all leaders on Taiwan say.They needto persuade voters that they will protect the incomes and freedoms of Taiwan peoplefrom the uncertain future posed by the scary power across the strait.PresbyterianPresident Lee is still remembered for likening himself to "Moses leading his peopleout of Egypt"—a liberation the PLA might prefer to perform.Lee Teng-hui speaksfor unification ，but with such extended delays that he often sounds like a permanentautonomist."There is no need to declare 'independence，'"Lee remarked in 1997.In another 1997speech，Lee said ，"In our pursuit of national unification，weare concerned [that]Taiwan ，the Chinese mainland ，Hong Kong，and Macau mustbe united under the principles of democracy ，freedom，and equitable prosperity."Whether President Lee's gradualism really amounts to separatism （as most PRC elitesand some independence-minded Taiwan elites like to believe，for opposite reasons），he mainly favors slowness.Sociologist Hsiao Hsin-huang rightly says Lee hasa "deferral agenda."As a ROC official spokesman admitted ，the Taiwanese "generalpublic did not understand the real content of the policy 'no haste，be patient.'This will require more public education."In fact ，the island's people are aheadof their leaders.Taiwanese can reasonably ask whether a solution to Taiwan's long-termsecurity problem should depend so exclusively on slow developments elsewhere，acrossthe water.The current ROC policy evades Taiwan's most obvious need ，which islong-term peace.Procedures for dealing with hijackers，issuing visas，handlingfinancial transfers ，and cross-strait investment are all very helpful.But becausethere is no trust between political elites on the two sides ，these amenities areless important than the danger of war that important leaders on each side have interestsin not facing.When statespeople emphasize only economic and pragmatic confidencebuilding，but do not negotiate to get concrete means to maintain that confidence，they are not yet solving their main problem.The KMT Central Policy Council in 1996commissioned a group to write a "draft peace accord"with the PRC.This includeda clause that separatism might be "diffused"（huajie）。Nothing，however，latercame from this initiative.What has caused this arthritis in the capacity of Taiwan'sgovernment to make a mainland policy that will assure the island's security ？
Perhaps democratization is to blame ，but a more specific cause of this paralysisis a mix of past KMT dictatorship with the current principle of representation；memory of Chiang Kai-shek's restraint of Taiwanese politicians still inflames discourseon the island.Coalition dynamics within both major parties make mainstream KMTand DPP leaders unwilling to alienate a minority of strongly autonomist voters infavor of a larger number of less certain voters who would condone unification withthe mainland under some conditions.Taiwan people's knowledge of past PRC state-fosteredviolence（especially the Cultural Revolution）and the continuing fact that manykinds of mainland Chinese are poorly represented in Beijing are further factorsthat disincline most of the islanders from wanting unification any time soon.Veryfew DPP or KMT politicians are willing to moot political arrangements with Beijing，even for distant future times ，except in private.The probability of an all-partyconsensus ，even for a temporary truce with the mainland ，is near zero.I havebeen able to raise the truce proposal directly in conversations with governmentfigures on Taiwan （the Vice-President，the Premier，and the KMT and MAC chairmen—and thanks go to all of them for making time for this in their busy schedules ）。But there was no clear response.Even a prominent and ardently autonomist DPP senatordid not fully reject the truce idea ，perhaps because it does not absolutely forsweara possibility of Taiwan independence after fifty years.But he doubted（perhapsrightly ）that the mainland would agree to it.Taiwan autonomists "hope againsthope"that China after half a century will not be much stronger in the world thanat present.But they suspect otherwise，and they know this presents a securityproblem.All the KMT respondents were plainly more afraid of the DPP than of thePLA.Several opined that even an agreement with the mainland not to take actions（as in this proposed truce ），although that would constitutionally require nonew ROC legislation ，would still have to pass Taiwan's Legislative Yuan.The 1996inter-party consensus document apparently trumps the ROC constitution.Such a norm，so long as it is adhered to ，ties the hands of Taipei's negotiators so tightlythat no real accord with the mainland is conceivable.Beijing will minimally demandat least the possibility of a Chinese future for Taiwan ，and Taipei's minorityof determined separatists will veto that.Would a serious truce also be a non-starterin Beijing？It has not been possible for this foreigner to make the same interviewsat similar levels in the mainland's less open system.PRC militarists almost surelyoppose a truce because their budgets and political influence would be lessened bypeace.For Beijing hardliners ，the Taiwan issue provides hardy perennial support.Some leaders stress that Taiwan's "unreasonable"delay in negotiating unificationwill justify using force（although part of this delay probably derives from thetime necessary to improve backward elements of China's military technology）。IfBeijing's main interest is to make room to pressure Taiwan，rather than to maximizethe chance of peaceful unification with Taiwanese whom mainlanders regard as Chinesetoo ，then Beijing will reject a truce.Do the leaders there prefer Leninist centralism，or do they prefer unification with people who at some point might willingly be Chinese？They have been ambiguous about this.Nothing here should be read to imply that onlythe Taipei elites are responsible for the likelihood of war in the strait.If awar begins，it will surely come from the PRC side.Missile tests have already gesturedas much ，more than once ，at a low level of violence whose importance is onlysymbolic.This syndrome is likely to continue ，and it could escalate.Reiterationsof rage often occur in identity wars，as is shown by other tribal conflicts（Israel/Palestineand Serbia/Kossovo are among the many examples）。The mere availability of rationallybalanced solutions to such feuds does not end them.They stop only when ，withineach camp simultaneously，softliners prevail over hardliners who benefit from thecontinuing tensions.Potential accommodationists probably exist in both camps（the president or premier of the PRC and any of the four top KMT politicians mightconceivably be among them ）。But they have thus far done nothing in public tohelp each other across the strait.Conditions for a truce exist ，but it probablywill not be achieved by Taipei and Beijing because some leaders in both capitalsbenefit from prolonging cross-strait friction.Before leaving this topic，it isnecessary for the sake of comprehensiveness to mention six exogenous factors thatcould affect the chances of success in a SEF-ARATS negotiation.For lack of spacehere，these can only be listed in the form of very short questions.First，willa potentially truce-seeking Beijing reformist leadership happen to emerge at thesame time as a potentially Chinese Taipei regime，given the separate courses ofpolitics in those two capitals？Second ，will Korea's unification process be smoothenough to make fair terms for China's seem credible （even though both Beijing andTaipei deny any similarity between these cases）？Third，will Japan exercise itsability to build a much stronger armed force？Fourth ，will China's relationswith Indonesia or other Southeast Asian nations affect the PRC-ROC dispute（as conflictsover miniscule reefs in the South China Sea have already been used to rationalizea PLA navy build-up that is actually more important for the much larger island ofTaiwan）？Fifth，will increased anti-Han separatist politics in Xinjiang，Ningxia，Inner Mongolia or Tibet create more fears in Beijing about China's potential fragmentation？Sixth ，might Beijing later react to dissent in Hong Kong in ways that affect theevolution of Beijing-Taipei relations ？None of these six exogenous issues —andnot even the Asian financial crisis —is likely to affect war or peace over Taiwanas much as the two more important political factors mentioned above ：hardlinersor reformists in Beijing，and national existentialists or moderates in Taipei.Of course ，the military balance and its future changes will also affect deterrenceor war in the strait.4）Can Taiwan's Army Defend the Island？
Taiwan's current military strength probably assures the ROC's autonomy for afew years into the future.Further additions to Taiwan's defenses might extend thatperiod—and would allow more time in which political changes might allow truce termsbetween Taipei and Beijing.But the military-economic balance will almost certainlytip in the PRC's favor after a decade or two.Barring a totally unexpected changein defensive technology that would raise its effectiveness for all modern armies，this advantage for Beijing is likely to become decisive in the long run.Taipeihas been unable to produce all the equipment it needs for effective defense ，andthere is no prospect this situation will change.Foreign weapons procurement hasbeen vital for Taiwan —and very expensive.One estimate of the budget for thesepurchases abroad in the mid-1990s runs at an annual rate of more than three timesthe total domestic costs of maintaining Taiwan's military.The foreign shoppinglist has included missiles of many kinds，jet fighters ，helicopters，early warningairplanes ，anti-submarine weapons ，and frigates.With the Cold War ended，defenseindustries in many nations（the US，France ，Singapore，Israel ，and others ）have wanted to make sales to Taiwan for commercial reasons.Taiwan is still receivingdelivery of 150F-16and 60Mirage aircraft ，plus at least 130more warplanesscheduled for production on the island.Despite a great deal of discussion of "theatermissile defense"systems，missiles are by no means the only weapons that the PLAmight try to use against Taiwan.A declared blockade of shipping around the island，perhaps partially enforced by marine mines that are relatively inexpensive，couldbe difficult even for modern forces to deter.PRC pressures against arms sales tothe ROC currently mean that Beijing and Taipei bid against each other.So the pricesrise.Taipei has paid them.This does not assure a successful defense of the island，especially if the PRC underestimates the indirect costs of a prolonged campaignagainst Taiwan's economy.The fact that America will continue its protection ofTaiwan，at least for some years，can be used by Beijing militarists to their advantagein PRC budget politics.Whenever the US has its necessary naval face-offs with China，the island is shielded in the short run —but in the long run ，this syndrome bringsBeijing decisions for more PLA spending on ships，mines，anti-ship cruise missiles，and other equipment that threatens Taiwan's and America's forces.The PRC has amilitary-industrial complex ，and it acts in domestic and interstate politics asits counterparts do elsewhere.But the PLA does not yet have the wherewithal forsure success in an attempt to defeat the island's forces.You Ji rightly suggeststhat the PLA's 1995-96military exercises ，whatever they may bode for the farfuture，mean the opposite of war soon："Until the PLA feels confident ，it willbe reluctant to be dragged into war.Militarily ，brinksmanship in essence buystime to secure PLA readiness."China's naval and air forces are slowly increasing，however.Hong Kong newspapers claim that President Jiang has pressed for a planby which the PRC would complete the building of an aircraft carrier.From Russia，China has arranged to buy ships that carry supersonic cruise missiles ，which mightconceivably damage even large American aircraft carriers.Perhaps China would pursuesuch weapons now even if the island of Taiwan had never risen above the waves.Butnew military technologies ，and the process of acquiring them，sharply reducePLA incentives to encourage a political deal with Taiwan.The target across thestrait is a plausible excuse for military investment.The same coin also has a civilianside：China's increasing weight in world politics gives many other countries lessinterest to resist Beijing on the Taiwan issue.The PRC might commit extensive resourcesto this ，including many that are economic rather than military.Of course ，armedaction by the PRC would be extremely expensive to China in economic terms.It wouldnot be unprecedented，however，because of China's decision to enter the KoreanWar （on a peninsula PRC leaders never claimed as Chinese ，against a US army thenalready fighting there，and in an era when China was relatively much weaker）。Beijing is more likely to use force if the issue is Taiwan independence ，ratherthan a deferral of Taiwan participation in China.So both the threat to Taiwan andthe options for its defense are more political than military.China's options forattack are likewise half economic and long drawn-out.As the ROC Defense MinisterChen Li-an has said ，Beijing before any invasion would probably "blockade Taiwanin order to suffocate its economy."The PLA could rather easily impose a damagingpartial blockade against Taiwan's trade —but then，it could not quickly or easilyinvade the island and win a strategic victory.PRC military options also includea mere announcement of a blockade without much enforcement.This would affect insurancerates at least.This ploy might be combined with marine mines and armed missilestrikes outside Keelung and Kaohsiung harbors ，where unarmed PRC "practice"missileshave already landed.An air battle over the strait is also conceivable，but itwould not assure victory to either side for several weeks.The outcomes of any ofthese options —or a combination of them—would probably take at least a month todetermine.During that period ，the US might resupply Taiwan's forces or participatedirectly.So the slow and therefore uncertain effectiveness of all PLA strategicoptions explains why China has not already adopted any of them.Even PLA generalsmight ，for a while，still entertain some proposals for a truce with Taiwan.Buttwo decades later ，China's array of military options will be greater as its relativetechnological level improves.Perhaps Taiwan's leaders are not actively seekingpolitical solutions to this military danger because they feel sure foreign forceswill protect them forever.5）Under What Conditions will America Help Defend Taiwan？
海峡两岸中国近代史学者的学术交流及其对中国近代历史的
台湾科技产业发展战略与政策措施