Since Woodrow Wilson's time ，it has been common knowledge that the US tendsideologically to endorse the political self-determination of peoples.Actual USpolicies have very often violated this ideology ，but the norm remains a US ideal. The issues to raise about this basis of US policy are four：First，does such aview misrepresent US internal politics？For better or worse，the China and Taiwanlobbies in America are more evenly matched than ，for example，the Israeli andArab lobbies.The US has not equally supported the empowerment of all nations.Ifthe PRC does not offer Taiwan unification terms under which competitive electionswill continue to choose the island's executive leaders（as Hong Kong elections donot ），or if Taipei makes clear it would accept such terms，Americans will certainlywant to help defend Taiwan's autonomy.But as Taiwanese ，of all people，shouldhave learned from US support of Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian regime（or perhapsfrom reading the thoughts of Samuel Huntington），Americans have not been consistentsupporters of majoritarian politics as such.Second ，the Taiwan Relations Act（TRA ）is a domestic US law ，not an international treaty of alliance.It saysAmerica will "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort toforce ……that would jeopardize……the people of Taiwan"and will "make availableto Taiwan such defense articles ……to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."But in the slippery style that should be expected of US lawyers ，it does not unambiguouslycommit America to defending the island with its own forces.The US government（for military purposes the President ，who is constitutionally Commander-in-Chiefno matter what reports Congress may require ）is likely to construe the TRA accordingto his or her view of overall US interests，including US prestige worldwide andUS interests in China.Nonetheless，the TRA should remain a major buttress fora potential cross-strait truce.In negotiating that ，Beijing cannot ask Taipeito rescind the TRA，since Taipei never passed it.If the ambiguous military aspectsof this foreign law give leaders on the small island more confidence that they canenter a credible truce with the big mainland，then even the imperialists may aidChinese unification.Third，each individual or collective can concurrently possessseveral different identities，any of which may become a basis for "self-determination."No group has an obvious right to determine the identity of any other，but any self-determinationimplies a responsibility to bear the consequences of whatever identity is selected.For example ，it is not evidently the right of mainland Chinese，nor certainlyof Americans，to tell Taiwanese who to be.By the same token ，Taiwanese ratherthan anyone else face the consequences that flow from the choices they make.Theyare accountable for any aftermath ，too，of the manner and time in which theypick their preferences.The American bias for the self-determination of peoples ，by democratic or any other methods，does not imply a US duty to be the main upholderof such a choice against resistance （unless some other US interest motivates adecision to help）。Max Weber has outlined the sort of morality that is relevanthere.A principle or "ultimate end，"e.g.an ethnicity ，does not exhaust theanalytic criteria for judging the ethics of a policy.What is right may also bedefined by net benefits ，consequences ，and "responsible"results.If most peopleon Taiwan decide they want to be Taiwanese and not Chinese（or if they postponethis choice until a time after which nobody will gain from trying to enforce it ），they alone have that right—and the parallel responsibility to take the consequences，alone if need be.Fourth，the US is interested in China's potential future democracyas well as Taiwan's current democracy.PRC and other Chinese leaders have oftenseen this interest merely as a legacy of missionary sermonizing ，19th centuryimperialism brought up-to-date in secular form.Do Americans have any concrete interestin making liberal critiques of authoritarian states with which US trade is profitable？Have the Americans any more-than-merely-meddlesome reasons to express themselveson human rights in places with different cultures such as China and Taiwan？DoAmericans benefit in protecting the island's people from a regime that still regularlyimprisons people for peaceful dissent ？The answer to these questions is positive.The US interest in foreign democracies is not just altruistic and not just electoralrhetoric by American politicians.Beyond the fact that state elites as a genre（including those in the US ）all tend to be arrogant，it is possible to explaina universally presentable Realpolitik reason why any liberal regime wants othersin the world：Such states do not attack each other.Immanuel Kant was the firstto note this odd fact.（He claimed to know the reason ："It is the spirit of commercethat sooner or later takes hold of every nation and is incompatible with war."）But the democratic peace conjecture is most cogent as an empirical finding，notas a normative philosophy.The theoretical reasons why it holds true in historicalcases are quite unclear.Recent research has refined the conjecture by looking atconflicts of various sizes，showing that democracies go to war as often as otherregimes —although not against each other ，and often against weaker states.Geographicaldistances and past alliance patterns may affect the evidence.Authoritarian countriesthat are arguably in the process of democratization （the PRC is the globe's largestexample in this coding category ）tend to be particularly bellicose，althoughthey become more pacific toward other liberal states when democracy seems irreversible.Also，international institutions can engage non-liberal countries in peace mechanisms（e.g.，at the UN，where the PRC has gained so much face on the Security Councilthat it has behaved more carefully than anyone had earlier predicted）。Such institutionshelp the non-violent resolution of disputes regardless of state forms.But establisheddemocracies apparently need nothing more than their mutual liberalism to get alongwell，even when they have radically different levels of objective power.This historicalbut atheoretical conjecture has become an explicit ideological basis of Americanforeign policy.President Bill Clinton said in his 1994State of the Union speechthat "democracies don't attack each other."If so （and presuming the US will remaina democracy ），then there is a ubiquitous Realpolitik rather than a culture-specificmoralizing argument that a long-term aim of American policy should be to expandthe number and power of other democracies.The US wants to maintain its internationalinterests without much need to expend lives and wealth in future wars.China，becauseof its size and increasing national power ，is the country to which these considerationsare most relevant.The "realist"argument for more democracies concerns future UScost-savings；so it applies most to America's relations with large countries ，and China is very large.Taiwan's smaller size is not a fault of the island's people，but it is a fact whose relevance to US interests in extending democratic peace toChina even Taiwanese can understand.One of the two mammoth ex-Communist countries，Russia，has shown that states once run by Leninist parties can evolve at leasthaltingly in a liberal direction.When this happened，US costs abroad declinedsharply.China has now finished its violent revolution，and its internal politicsare probably moving into a very uneasy era of conflict because of the power derogationthat is taking place.Competitive national elections and freedoms of public speechare not promised anytime soon ，and some "Asian values"of political obediencemight survive even an economic downturn.But the world's largest polity is nonethelessgradually diversifying.As the revolutionary generation dies，technocrats havereplaced them —and a greater variety of politicians is likely to follow.If thePRC becomes a democracy ，the predictable American savings （fewer dollars neededfor security，fewer soldiers killed in future wars ）are large.That is the long-termpolicy significance of the historical fact of democratic peace.So America's democraticinterest in Taiwan is largely that the island can be Chinese.Taiwan's liberal evolutionsuggests that the world's most populous （and perhaps far-future most powerful）nation might develop into a country with which the US can have stable and fruitfulrelations over the long term.Democratic civilizations have never violently clashed.Taipei's policymakers should be aware ，at least ，that many Washington gurusthink this way.Clinton's National Security Advisor ，Samuel Berger，asked ina 1997speech at the Council on Foreign Relations ："Can China successfully makethe next great leap toward a modern economy in the information age without producingthe result of empowering its people ，further decentralizing decision making ，and giving its citizens more choice in their lives？"He answered his own question，"Possible ，but I doubt it."Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has opined that，"China will be a rising force in Asian and world affairs.The history of this centuryteaches us the wisdom of trying to bring such a power into the fold as a responsibleparticipant in the international system ，rather than driving it out into the wildernessof isolation."Nonliberal regimes have difficulty sustaining themselves in countrieswith incomes over $6，000per-capita，if indices of health and education are alsonot too low.This is a strong empirical correlation rather than a normative theory，and it has no exceptions among large countries.China's level of modernization isstill medium-low，even though it has risen smartly in recent decades.China willdemocratize ，if it becomes much richer and thus more powerful.Every country isof course unique in particular ways.But no sizeable country has attained a medium-highlevel of modernization（moderate GNP per capita with extensive literacy and widespreadpublic health ）without becoming a democracy.The only debatable exceptions tothis empirical rule are small states（e.g.，Brunei ），especially city-statesunder potential threat or legal jurisdiction from much larger neighbors （Singaporeor Hong Kong）。There are simply no others on the planet.Anyone who doubts thisshould inspect "Table 1"of any recent year's Human Development Report from theUnited Nations Development Programme，on which （with these small possible exceptionsonly）the first 35states are all unapologetic liberal democracies.Whether thisvery strong correlation between wealth and tolerant pluralism is cosmically rightor wrong，it is a fact.Future progress toward this situation in China may wellprove to be bumpy.But leaders on Taiwan—itself a rich democracy that would beapproximately number 25on the UNDP list if it were in the UN —can depend on thepractical certainty that mainland China will take this state form too when it becomesrich enough.Even though PRC power is rising，many years will pass before it rivalsthat of the US for the purpose of defending a major island against a conventionalinvasion.China's political modernization is likely to take even more time，however，than the development of a decisive PRC military threat.The US certainly shouldnot reduce its military forces in East Asia ，if it hopes to deter war there.Butmilitary power without a clear political goal becomes ineffective.Democracy inTaiwan is worth much more to America if democrats on that island define it as dodemocrats in Hong Kong，i.e.，as Chinese.Acceptable terms for Taiwan（whichwould be different from the ones indefensible Hong Kong had to accept ）may，ofcourse，never emerge from Beijing.But the separate existence of the TRA shouldraise the confidence of Taipei negotiators that a truce with Beijing would be safefor Taiwan at least in the medium term.The US really has a one-China policy，althoughmany intellectuals in both Beijing and Taipei disbelieve this.The US has nevermade a commitment to support Taiwan separatism，because such a policy would ensureeither an eventual war over the island or the eventual abandonment of the Taiwanese.A few voices in Taiwan，pointing to America's "mainland fever"（dalu re ），plausiblysuggest that the US will not protect Taiwan forever.Even if it did ，unificationistTaipei writers say，the island might have a firmer international standing thanit now does if it established a more secure link to China.In fact，American leadersadmire Taiwan's accomplishments a great deal；their enthusiasms are not all pro-Chinese.But the US will act in its long-term interests.For very many of these—rangingfrom North Korea to Iraq，global warming to financial crises —America can benefitfrom China's cooperation.Future Chinese democracy，and Taiwan's role in creatingor hindering it ，are serious eventual US concerns of particular relevance to thisessay.More immediately ，the US can also benefit from trying to deal with thePRC on a host of other global issues.Mainstream politicians on Taiwan do not stressthese aspects of their island's situation in public.They prefer to gamble that ，within the period when American military support for the island remains relativelyeasy because the PRC is still militarily weak ，the leaders of China will haveat least a temporary proto-liberal Epiphany and offer acceptable terms to Taiwan.This bet might conceivably win.More probably ，because of China's size，growth，and likely pluralization within a nationalist framework ，it might not.The politicianson Taiwan who take this kind of bet （as the erstwhile government of South Vietnamdid ）are risking a great deal on behalf of their people.Americans prefer to supportallies who have viable long-term policies of their own.The most negotiable suchpolicy might be an ARATS-SEF truce.Americans can show，to leaders on each sideof the strait ，that likely alternatives to a truce are more risky than acceptanceof a truce.One risk for Taipei is eventual invasion—and another ，oddly，isthe effect on US policy of conceivable democratization in China.Taiwan autonomistsdo not have a credible medium-term security policy for their island ，and a trucewould give them one.A risk for Beijing is that recurrent threats of force spurseparatist politics ，and the military technologies that a desperate Taipei coulddevelop are fast becoming cheaper ，both economically and politically.Beijing'sleaders could realize that China's relative power after half a century will almostsurely prejudge the unification issue in their favor—with or without an armistice—so the only real question they face is whether they want a war.Taipei's leaderscould realize that an eventual confederated China ，with democracy at least onTaiwan，would be a better prospect than a conflict taking place on their islandafter a decade or two.Peace would serve many other countries too ，including Japanand the Philippines ，and most notably the US.Conclusion：War is Avoidable butLikely Both the Beijing and Taipei regimes are obstructing chances for peace inthe Taiwan strait.Beijing is doing so because its political system is not yet constructedin a manner to inspire any confidence in Taiwan about the fulfillment of PRC termsfor unity ，to the extent these have been specified.In particular ，the kindsof Chinese on the mainland who are most like the Taiwanese（Southerners ，entrepreneurs，and civilians ）are underrepresented in high PRC positions of power，relativeto people who are more alien to Taiwan（Northerners ，bureaucrats，and soldiers）。Taipei politicians also obstruct peace，and fail their own citizens，by inaccuratelysuggesting that the island will be able to defend its autonomy forever.The UnitedStates unintentionally supports this war process.Most Americans are blissfullyunaware of this ，because Washington's policies concerning the cross-strait issuesince the early 1970s have fostered peace and wealth.Bureaucratic optimists inWashington are easily taken in by disingenuous statements from Taipei and Beijingsuggesting more interest in peace than the domestic politics in either of thosecapitals is likely to sustain.So the US thus far has felt no need to clarify theconditions of its defense aid to Taiwan.American statespeople should make clearthat they will help preserve Taiwan's liberalism as a precursor of specificallyChinese democracy ，as well as as an assertion of US general military prowess onbehalf of liberals.Beijing will object this is imperialism （a stance that wouldbe more convincing if Beijing did not also have an empire ）。Taipei will objectit is perfidious（a stance that would be more convincing if the history of US defenselinks to the ROC had nothing to do with Chiang Kai-shek as a Chinese）。Americanleaders should clarify in public that they will not defend Taipei from being politicallyconnected to Beijing，as soon as Beijing makes clear that its promises of practicalautonomy for Taiwanese can be backed by credible long-term guarantees of enforcementcontrolled for a long time on the island，not just by words from the mainland.But until the U.S.president sees that Taiwan's liberal system is safe（either becauseChina democratizes or has a credibly enforceable deal for Taiwan's system ），he/sheshould be absolutely clear—not "strategically ambiguous"—that an authoritarianattack on Taiwan will be deterred.At present ，there is scant prospect that eitherTaipei or Beijing will do enough to prevent the likelihood of war between them.Washington will probably be drawn into such a conflict，even though its aims insuch an effort would remain ambiguous.The US could predictably win the battles ，but not the sequels.The current trend toward this conflict is beneficial in theshort term to hardline politicians in Beijing and Taipei（and perhaps to militaryspenders in Washington also ）。If this trend is not counterveiled within the nextfew years ，the later result will be costly for all parties.
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海峡两岸中国近代史学者的学术交流及其对中国近代历史的
台湾科技产业发展战略与政策措施
